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INTRODUCTION 
 
The five years anniversary gala for the launch of the Eastern Partnership has passed almost 
unnoticed.  The  conference  dedicated  to  this  anniversary,  organized  by  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs of the Czech Republic in Prague on April 25, 2014, under the patronage of the President of 
the Czech Republic, brought together, with few exceptions, only the second-ranking diplomatic 
representatives  and  academic  experts  from  the  European  Union,  the  partner  countries  and  the 
Russian Federation (Conference "Eastern Partnership Five Years on: Time for a New Strategy", 
2014).  The  Ukrainian  crisis  and  the  negotiations  for  its  settlement  have  overshadowed  the 
conference  held  in  the  capital  of  the  Czech  Republic,  although  the  influence  of  the  Eastern 
Partnership  on  developments  in  Ukraine  was  substantial.  Moreover,  into  the  message  sent  to 
participants at the conference, European Commission President, Mr. Barroso, remarked rightly that 
"Events in Ukraine today show that the relevance and necessity of the Eastern Partnership is clearer 
today than it has ever been." (Barroso, 2014). 
Paradoxically, one of the most prudent instruments of the EU foreign policy - the Eastern 
Partnership – has catalyzed one of the most terrible crisis of the post-war period. Perhaps the most 
serious, because, for the first time after the Second World War, there held an annexation of a 
territory  of  a  sovereign  and  independent  state  by  another  state  in  Europe.  Amid  the  European 
                                                 
*  Associate  Professor  of  Political  Science,  Dimitrie  Cantemir  Christian  University,  Bucharest,  Romania;  e-mail: 
gciascai@gmail.com.  
CES Working Papers –Volume VI, Issue 2A 
  32 
priority given resolving internal effects of the economic crisis, the real weakness of the CFSP of the 
European  Union,  very  little  used  in  the  Eastern  Neighbourhood,  the  rifts  and  the  diversit y  of 
European options of the six partner countries in Eastern Europe, and not least, the Russian strategy 
to restore this influence in its near western abroad, the Eastern Partnership recorded a questionable 
result. 
In this context, the objective of this article is to highlight the political and strategic limits of 
EU approach concerning its Eastern Neighbourhood and geopolitical dilemmas of this approach. 
For  this  reason,  the  research  will  examine  main  steps  of  the  implementation  of  the  Eastern 
Partnership  and  the  main  consequences  and  dilemmas  of  this  implementation  for  the  Eastern 
European partners, especially for Ukraine. Also, the paper will investigate the impact of the Eastern 
Partnership  for  the  Russian  approach  concerning  the  near  western  abroad  and  concerning  the 
European Union. 
 
1. THE  EASTERN  PARTNERSHIP  BEFORE  THE  VILNIUS  SUMMIT:  -  THE 
EXCESSIVE PRUDENCE AND THE AMBIGUITY  
 
In the early 2000s, the European Union launched, almost simultaneously, two strategies that 
have marked the behaviour of the Union in respect of the regions in the immediate proximity, 
including the Eastern Neighbourhood. Thus, in December 2003, at  the proposal  of the HR  for 
CFSP, Javier Solana, the European Council  enacted  the European Security Strategy (A Secure 
Europe in a Better World, 2003), while in March of the same year, the European Commission 
initiated a strategy on the European Neighbourhood, European Neighbourhood Policy / ENP (Wider 
Europe - neighbourhood: A Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Europe, 2003). 
If  we  look  at  the  European  Security  Strategy,  we  will  find  that  among  the  three  main 
objectives  of  this  strategy  the  building  security  in  the  European  Neighbourhood,  both  in  the 
southern and in the eastern regions, but without specifying the means of achieving this goal (A 
Secure Europe in a Better World, 2003). In turn, the European Commission's initiative concerning 
neighbourhood tried somehow to fill this deficiency, by providing a framework for cooperation with 
all neighbouring countries of the European Union from the south of the Mediterranean Sea, or from 
the Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. In addition, by using the financing instrument and 
the bilateral action plans, the Commission's strategy on neighbourhood provided for all partner 
countries the useful means to support their policies of the economic reform and the modernization  
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of governance through cooperation and consultation with the EU, including the association with 
European Single Market (Ciascai, 2012). 
Largely, this double European approach seemed to meet the needs and expectations of the 
neighbours situated on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, some of them already benefiting 
from EU Association Agreements and their positive effects. Instead, for the states located in the 
space between the expanding European Union and a Russian Federation willing and able to reaffirm 
the interests in near abroad, the EU's ambitions were too limited and ambiguous, especially on size 
CFSP (Popescu, 2005). 
In this context, to come to greet aspirations about the European Neighbourhood Policy of 
some  Eastern  partners,  who  wanted  a  closer  relationship  with  the  European  Union,  including 
European integration, following the proposals and the tenacious actions of Poland and Sweden, EU 
launched in 2009 at the summit in Prague Eastern Partnership (Joint Declaration of Prague Eastern 
Partnership Summit, 2009). 
The new foreign policy instrument was an adaptation of European Neighbourhood Policy at 
the specific circumstances of the Eastern Neighbourhood and covered all states located between the 
European Union and the Russian Federation, including those visible backtracked on the democracy 
and the respect for human rights like Belarus. Basically, the Eastern Partnership provided to the 
countries concerned a common and multilateral platform for engagement between those states, the 
European  Union  and  the  Member  States  of  EU,  which  was  likely  to  deepen  the  process  of 
rapprochement between the EU and its partners and finally to support the full association with the 
EU (Ciascai, 2012). 
The initiative for the eastern partners started from the idea of a stronger political involvement 
of  EU  Member  States  and  the  EU.  This  stronger  involv ement  was  based  on  the  institutional 
multilateral  cooperation  structures  in  four  thematic  platforms  and  on  the  strengthen ing  of  the 
bilateral framework with each state by opening negotiations on Association Agreements between 
the EU and partner countries (Ciascai, 2012). In addition, the Eastern Partnership has benefited 
from an increase of the financial resources available which amounted to 2.5 billion euros in the 
period  2010-2104  (Fulle,  2014).  The  assessments  about  the  effects  of  EU  financial  aid  for  th e 
eastern  partners  are  more  pessimistic,  despite  positive  trends  in  Georgia  and  in  Republic  of 
Moldova (Kaca, E., Sobjak, A., Zasztowt, K., 2014). 
The  four  thematic  platforms  of  the  Eastern  Partnership  were  focused  on  priority  areas  of 
cooperation  agreed  between  the  EU  and  partner  countries.  These  areas  are:  “democracy,  good 
governance and stability; economic integration and convergence with EU sectoral policies; energy  
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security; and Contacts between people” (Joint Declaration of Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, 
2009, p. 9). The way of working in these formulas is based on the active involvement of partner 
countries and EU Member States, on the multilateral dialogue and on the exchange of information 
between  participants.  European  officials  also  hoped  that  this  way  will  encourage  a  genuine 
rapprochement between the EU and the Eastern partners (Ciascai, 2012).  
In addition, to allow the adequate monitoring and the evaluation of the process of cooperation 
with each partner, the Eastern Partnership set a timetable for execution of actions planned and a 
rigorous roadmap. An evaluation in technical terms of the meetings held in the four platforms and 
the progress of bilateral negotiations in association agreements with some partner countries such as 
Ukraine,  Armenia,  Georgia  and  Moldova  in  the  first  four  years  after  launching  of  the  Eastern 
Partnership  indicated  on  mid-2014,  a  few  months  before  the  summit  in  Vilnius,  an  important 
commitment  of  the  EU  vis-a-vis  of  the  Eastern  partners.  But  a  more  demanding  political  and 
strategic examination the EU approaches in the framework of the Eastern Partnership indicated 
rather a constant concern of the EU to spare the susceptibilities of the Russian Federation. This 
concern was manifested in the constant avoidance of the topic of potential EU membership for the 
Eastern partners, despite the legitimacy of such aspirations in accordance with the EU Treaty, and 
the  acceptance  of  the  certain  "red  lines"  suggested  tacit  or  explicit  by  Moscow  regarding  the 
management of the security issues into Eastern Neighbourhood. The absence of the security subject 
from the Eastern Partnership agenda and the shy use of the EU security tools like CFSP in the 
Eastern Neighbourhood, despite the many outbreaks of conflict in this area, confirmed the prudence 
of the EU commitment to this region (Ciascai, 2013). 
This  excessive caution of the EU towards a  region  which  is  vital  to  protect  its  interests, 
otherwise known in the European Security Strategy, can lead to the precarious outcome in Vilnius. 
The stop of the Armenian negotiations on the EU Association Agreement for joining the Eurasian 
Union proposed by the Russian Federation on September 2013 and Yanukovich refuse to sign the 
Association  Agreement  as  a result of Russian pressure seemed to  prefigure  a real  mess of the 
Eastern Partnership (Popescu and Dreyer, 2014). Finally, the EU – Georgia and the EU – Republic 
of Moldova Association  Agreements  has been initialled in  Vilnius  and the Eastern Partnership 
survived. 
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2. THE VILNIUS SUMMIT OUTCOMES: - THE CATALYST OF UKRAINE CRISIS? 
 
The last moment resignation of the Ukrainian leaders to sign the Association Agreement and 
Deep  Free  Trade  Entertainment  at  EU  summit in  Vilnius  on  28  November  2013  revealed  two 
distinct political phenomena. On the one hand, at the EU level, the refuse of Ukraine reveals the 
inability of the European negotiators to persuade the most important Eastern partner to associate 
with the Union. In addition, at the Eastern Neighbourhood level, the summit in Vilnius confirmed 
the assessments on differentiation of the Eastern partner states into two groups, the EU-oriented 
states, Georgia and Republic of Moldova, and the non EU-oriented states, Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
and the singular status of Ukrainian, namely its inability to make a clear choice on the relationship 
with the EU (Kaca, E., Sobjak, A., Zasztowt, K., 2014). 
It  is  possible  that  the  insistence  of  the  European  leaders  to  condition  the  signing  of  the 
Association Agreement with Ukraine on the fulfilment of substantially political exigencies (see, the 
request  for  release  from  the  prison  of  the  former  Prime  Minister  Yulia  Timoshenko)  and  the 
absence of a clear post-association perspective for Ukraine be weakened the attractiveness of the 
European  Union.  But  certainly,  the  oscillation,  the  hesitation  and  the  duplicity  of  the  Ukraine 
administration led by Viktor Yanukovich, even before the summit in Vilnius, generated a strong 
international discrediting Ukraine and an aggravation of the constant internal rifts in the Ukrainian 
society. 
Through  the  Vilnius  failure  and  the  sudden  reorientation  to  Moscow  of  Yanukovich 
administration,  the  recession  that  knocks  the  Ukrainian  economy  and  the  suspicions  about  the 
endemic corruption that reigned in Ukraine has been an accelerated radicalization of the Ukrainian 
political climate. The outbreak of anti-government protests in Kiev, immediately after the summit in 
Vilnius,  revealed,  first  of  all,  the  existence  of  a  strong  pro-European  segment  in  the  political 
establishment  and  in  the  Ukrainian  society,  and  also  the  incapacity  of  the  regime  led  by  V. 
Yanukovich to meet the expectations of the public who took seriously the European values and the 
EU-Ukraine  Association  Agreement.  Secondly,  the  extension,  the  radicalization  and  the 
proliferation  of  the  protests  into  other  regions  of  Ukraine  ant  their  violent  turn  indicated  the 
inability of the Kiev government to negotiate a political settlement with protesters and to stop the 
deepening of the fault lines in Ukrainian society and the weaknesses of the Ukrainian state . 
Thus, due to political inability of the authorities led by Victor Yanukovich was revived and 
aggravated gradually the linguistic, political and economic cleavages between western and eastern 
regions that have marked the evolution of independent Ukraine from its separation from the Soviet  
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Union in late 1991 (Gerard , 2014). On this line, a significant phenomenon highlighted by some 
authors  about  the  developments  in  the  independent  Ukraine  is  the  recurrent  reactivation  of  the 
separatism in the eastern and southern regions, with Russian support, during the periods when the 
political Eastern Ukrainian elites lost the control of the central administration in Kiev (Meister, 
2014. The Yanukovich failure of the management of the political crisis catalysed by the result in 
Vilnius  summit  and  the  violence  that  accompanied  the  collapse  of  the  reg ime  revealed  an 
unambiguous  role  of  the  Russian  Federation  in  undermining  the  territorial  integrity  of  Ukraine, 
since the end of February 2014 (Wolczuk, 2014). 
 
3.  WHAT  NEXT:  THE  EASTERN  NEIGHBORHOOD  BETWEEN  THE 
EUROPEANIZATION AND THE RUSSIAN RECONQUISTA? 
 
After over two months of anti-government protests in Kiev and in other Ukrainian regions and 
after a tentative of bloody crackdown, the giving up to the presidential prerogatives by Viktor 
Yanukovich and the taking power in Kiev by the coalition of the pro-European parties not resolved 
the domestic Ukrainian crisis, aggravated by eastern and southern separatism (Paul, 2014), and 
caused an international crisis unprecedented since the end of World War II. 
The crisis in Ukraine and the events that followed in the country after the Vilnius summit 
marks so far a rupture in the European and global geopolitics. The tacit or explicit red lines set by 
the  Euro-Atlantic  organizations  and  the  Russian  Federation  in  their  area  of  interference  from 
Eastern  Europe  (including  Southern  Caucasus)  were  brutally  violated  by  the  annexation  of  the 
Crimea by the Russian Federation. 
Only  in  this  context,  amid  the  weakness  and  the  obvious  inability  of  post-Yanukovich 
Ukrainian  authorities  to  effectively  respond  to  the  centrifugal  tendencies  of  the  south-eastern 
regions, stimulated and supported by the Russian Federation in full counteroffensive (Taran, 2014), 
the  EU  decision-makers  and  Member  States  have  understand  the  magnitude  of  the  cataclysm 
underway  in  Eastern  Europe.  However,  the  epithets  on  irrational  and  illegal  behaviour  of  the 
Russian  government,  the  recurrent  comparative  analyses  between  the  Putin  regime  and  the  the 
international  Nazi  regime behaviour before World War II or the Western sanctions  against the 
Russian  Federation  are  insufficient  to  address  the  concerns  of  states  situated  in  the  Eastern 
Neighbourhood. 
From this perspective, only the returning of the EU and member states leaders, along with 
North American allies in NATO, to a combined approach that include the  hard and soft power  
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actions would be able to temper the coolness of the Russian Federation in this region of Europe. 
The deployment of additional forces and capabilities in the allied NATO countries, located on the 
border with the Russian Federation, the emergency financial assistance given to post-Ianukovich 
regime by FMI, the signing of the political party the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement on March 
21 2014, the liberalization of the visa regime for Moldova’s citizens since April 28 or the launch of 
a strategy of Moscow's international isolation are some concrete steps for stopping the Reconquista 
campaign triggered by the Russian Federation in the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood. 
Other European projects regarding the initiation of an EU police mission in south-eastern 
regions of Ukraine, the setting up a European Energy Union to reduce EU dependence on Russian 
Federation and the acceleration of the procedure to signing the EU Association Agreements with 
Georgia and Moldova before June 2014 are the additional steps that EU would be able to complete 
in the near future on the above. In this context, it may be recovered the viable segments of the 
Eastern Partnership to strengthen the association process with Georgia, Republic of Moldova and 
Ukraine as well as to open the official perspective of their full European integration. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear that the Eastern Partnership, as enacted by the EU and partners summit in Prague in 
May  2009,  has  been  a  quasi  failure.  Although  European  objectives  such  as  fostering  good 
governance  in  partner  countries,  the  European  norms  and  values  dissemination  or  the  partial 
association in some of the EU policies were rather cautious and less ambitious in terms of policy 
and strategy, they were perceived as threats to Moscow for the Russian influence in Eastern Europe 
and  Southern  Caucasus.  The  Europeans'  lack  of  ambition,  the  failure  and  the  weakness  of  the 
governments of the partner states and the ability and the determination of the Russian Federation to 
control the former Soviet republics contributed at the quasi failure of the Eastern Partnership. 
Paradoxically,  even  if  the  Eastern  Partnership  objectives  were  largely  missed,  it  has  two 
undeniable merits. The first is to put an end to hypocrisy covering the EU's relations with the 
Russian Federation, including the tacit  red lines agreed by  some EU leaders and the Russians 
leaders  on  the  Eastern  Neighbourhood.  The  second  merit  of  the  Eastern  Partnership  is  to  be 
supported and strengthened the (pro) European elites and the societies that actually exist in some 
Eastern  European  states  such  as  Georgia,  Republic  of  Moldova  and  Ukraine.  Considering  this 
aspect, an Eastern Partnership adjusted and more ambitious could be revived by the EU to respond  
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effectively  and  consistently  to  expectations  of  these  states  in  a  radically  changed  geopolitical 
context. 
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